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Abstract 
The relationship between school reforms, specifically those involving the introduction of 
new school types, and pupil performance is studied. The particular context is the 
introduction of academy schools in England, but related evidence on Swedish free schools 
and US charter schools is also presented. The empirical evidence shows a causal positive 
impact of the conversion of disadvantaged schools to academies on end of school pupil 
performance and on subsequent probability of degree completion at university.  There is 
heterogeneity in this impact, such that more disadvantaged pupils and those attending 
London academies experience bigger performance improvements.  
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of international student tests such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) or 
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) have placed the 
importance of equitably and efficiently designed and managed school systems back on top of 
the policy agenda in many countries.
1
 Over the past decade, a number of countries have 
introduced reforms to their education systems with the aim of achieving better overall 
outcomes and reducing educational inequalities. These reforms have included introducing 
higher educational requirements for teachers (e.g. France), delaying tracking of students (e.g. 
Germany), increasing the length of the school day (e.g. France), and increasing the scope for 
exercising more autonomy in existing schools (e.g. Portugal) or introducing new school 
types with more autonomy (e.g. England). 
This paper focusses on the last of these school reforms, where new types of schools 
were introduced into education systems. The particular focus is on the short and medium 
term impact of a large-scale reform in England that introduced a new school type - the 
academy school - to the education landscape. Initially, these schools were typically 
conversions of pre-existing low performing schools. Academy schools have higher levels of 
autonomy than the previously predominant community schools, that is, schools operating 
under the remit of a local education authority. The aim of this paper is to understand whether 
the autonomy gains after conversion led to an improvement in student outcomes.   
There are several reasons why granting schools more autonomy over how they 
allocate resources, the teachers they hire, how they set teacher pay, the teaching methods 
they use or what speciality subjects they offer in their curriculum might increase school 
performance and student outcomes. For instance, more autonomy may allow schools to 
                                                        
1
 See Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) for discussion of these international test scores and their widespread 
use in research. 
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adapt better to the needs and wishes of the local community and student population. 
Likewise, greater autonomy over the choice of school leadership may allow governing 
bodies to select better and more suitable headteachers than a government authority that may 
be less informed about local circumstances and needs.  
However, individual schools and policy makers may have conflicting interests, 
making transfer of power to schools problematic. For example, the government might have 
as an objective the reduction in student inequality and segregation by ability. One way to 
achieve this is to impose ability blind admission procedures. Were schools to be provided 
with the freedom to set their own admissions policies they would have an incentive to admit 
only the best students, which could lead to higher levels of inequality. Similarly, allowing 
autonomous schools to select their own teachers, as opposed to having them assigned via a 
centralised mechanism, may cause greater selection of the best teachers into more 
autonomous schools, potentially leading to an increase in inequality.  
Analysing the causal effect of increased autonomy can prove difficult because of 
several potential endogeneity problems. A naive comparison of outcomes between students 
who attend schools with high levels of autonomy and those who attend schools with low 
levels of autonomy is likely to be biased if unobservable characteristics are related to both 
school choice and student performance. Schools with higher autonomy have the scope to 
exercise freedoms that enable them to attract students from better family backgrounds, or 
they may attract better teachers because they have different pay schemes and incentives than 
non-autonomous schools. Likewise, in a setting where new schools with more autonomy are 
set up, the identification of the causal effect of attendance is made difficult by the absence of 
pre-treatment outcomes for these schools.
2
  
                                                        
2
 Another factor making the study of more autonomy difficult is that it can mean a wide range of things, for 
instance having freedoms to hire teachers and set their salaries, determining subjects taught and teaching 
methods, or freedom over how to allocate budget across teaching and other activities. This makes it hard to pin 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
3 
 
Research that is related to our study has been undertaken on two new types of 
schools that have been introduced in the US and Sweden - charter schools and free schools. 
Some of this work, especially in the US setting, spends a lot of time and effort in trying to 
uncover the causal effect of attending a specific school (sometimes using lottery assignment 
of places when schools are oversubscribed). Some of the empirical approaches used in this 
work are relevant to what we do in this paper, and we review some of this growing literature 
below. Another strand of research looks at the effects of school autonomy on student 
performance using cross-country PISA and TIMSS data. This literature however often fails 
to deal with the problem of within-country selection into more autonomous schools, and is 
therefore unable to uncover causal effects of more autonomy on student outcomes (see 
Hanushek, Link and Woessmann, 2013).
3
  
The specifics of the English reform provide us with a setting that allows for the 
identification of the causal effect of giving schools more autonomy by analysing the effect of 
academy conversion. The reform meant that existing schools were converted to academy 
status, hence we can implement a difference–in-differences approach where we use those 
pupils who attend early academy converters as a treatment group and those who attend 
schools that later convert to academies as a control group. Additionally, by looking only at 
students already enrolled in the school before the conversion took place (in the terminology 
of Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014, ‘grandfathered’ or pre-enrolled students) we can remove 
potential effects that work through changes in pupil composition post conversion, and avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                           
down which aspects of autonomy may be conducive to better performance or lower inequality across schools 
and students. The English reform does not directly allow us to disentangle the separate effects of different 
aspects of autonomy on student performance, but we present evidence in Section 5 on what type of autonomies 
were reportedly most used by headteachers of academy schools. Section 2 also presents evidence on US charter 
schools that shed light on mechanisms that drive school improvement through more autonomy.  
3
 An exception is Verschelde et al. (2015) who uncover a significant positive effect of school staff autonomy on 
student performance by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in school staff autonomy levels within the 
same school types using PISA data. 
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problems associated with selection on unobservable characteristics into schools that have 
been converted.
4
  
Using hypothetical years of exposure for pre-enrolled students at a to-be-converted 
school as an instrument for actual years of exposure to the converted academy, we find that, 
on average, attending  a more autonomous academy school increases exam outcomes at age 
16 by 7.2 percent of a standard deviation per year of exposure. It also increases the 
likelihood of degree completion within five years of completing compulsory education by 
0.7 percentage points, which is equivalent to around a 10 percent rise compared to the 
average in our sample. More flexible specifications suggest that positive effects increase 
non-linearly with years of exposure, with those having attended an academy for four years 
gaining 29 percent of a standard deviation in age 16 exam outcomes, compared to 4 percent 
of a standard deviation for those with only one year of exposure, and 2.4 percentage points 
in terms of the likelihood of degree completion, compared to only 0.8 percentage points for 
those who attended the academy for only one year prior to conversion. 
Analysis of heterogeneous effects show that for short term outcomes, the impact of 
attending an autonomous school are larger for disadvantaged students (students eligible for 
free school meals), who gain 8.9 percent of a standard deviation, compared to 6.3 percent for 
those not eligible for free school meals, and this gap holds both for boys and girls. Medium 
term outcomes do not seem to differ much across subgroups. Interestingly, consistent with 
various studies that emphasise big improvements in the performance of pupils studying in 
schools in London over the last ten to fifteen years (Burgess, 2014; Blanden et al., 2015), we 
find bigger effects of academy conversion for pupils enrolled in schools in the capital. These 
results are consistent with evidence from US charter schools where effects tend to be 
stronger for disadvantaged students and students in urban areas (Angrist et al., 2013). We 
                                                        
4
 The analysis therefore focuses on those individuals who were pre-enrolled in the school prior to conversion, 
but excludes the small number of pupils who join the school after conversion.  
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also offer some descriptive evidence on mechanisms that could have led to the gains from 
greater autonomy, which appear to be changes in leadership, changes to the curriculum on 
offer and changes to the performance management system for teachers and improved 
collaboration with other schools.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives information on the 
English reform and how this affected school autonomy and discusses the existing evidence 
on the impact of school reform on student outcomes for the US and Sweden. Section 3 
introduces the data used for this study and the empirical strategy used to identify the casual 
effect of academy introduction on short and medium term outcomes. Section 4 and 5 present 
the main results and heterogeneous effects, respectively, and section 6 concludes.   
 
2. School reform in England and internationally 
Until about fifteen years ago, the English education system was marked by a 
relatively homogenous school landscape, which involved a majority of secondary modern 
schools or community schools – traditional publicly funded and locally managed schools – 
who made up 66% of schools in 2002 (Eyles, Hupkau and Machin, 2015). Religious schools 
(known as voluntary aided and voluntary controlled schools), foundation schools and a very 
small number of City Technology Colleges made up the remaining 34% of state schools in 
the country.
5
 Column (1) of Table 1 shows the numbers of each of these types of state 
schools in England in the school year of 2001/2.
6
 
 Community schools in England operate under the remit of local authorities who are 
responsible for funding and budgets, determining admission policies, employing school staff, 
and appointing members to school governing bodies. School governing bodies play a vital 
                                                        
5
 England also has fee paying private schools, which about 7% of students attend (Independent Schools 
Council, 2015).  
6
 The notes to the Table give more detail on the characteristics of the different types of English secondary 
schools. 
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role in the decision making for a range of aspects in England. Among other things, they are 
responsible for budget decisions, appointing and dismissing staff, and holding the 
headteacher accountable for school performance. 
In the early 2000s, an increasing preoccupation with inequality in student outcomes 
across schools, and in particular a widespread recognition of the poor performance of some 
inner city schools in deprived neighbourhoods, led the government to introduce a new type 
of school - the academy school. Academy schools are removed from local authority control 
and receive their funding directly from the central government. The possibility for academy 
conversion during the 2000’s – the ‘initial programme’ - was restricted to very low 
performing schools. After a change in government in 2010, the possibility of conversion was 
made available to all types of school rather than just secondary schools. In addition, rather 
than the conversions mostly being low performing schools like those we study in this paper, 
many high performing schools also took up the opportunity to become an academy.
7
  
Column (2) of Table 1 shows that by the 2008/09 school year, there were 133 
academies open and operating. The reform was the start of what was to become one of the 
most wide-ranging shifts in school organisation witnessed across Western Europe and the 
United States in recent history. Indeed, by 2015 community schools represented less than 
20% of all secondary schools in England, and academy schools accounted for 61%. Eyles, 
Hupkau and Machin (2015) and Eyles, Machin and Silva (2015) discuss various aspects of 
this mass academisation of English education (although not in terms of evaluating their 
impact on pupil performance, which it is still too early to do). This paper studies the 
performance effects of conversion for schools obtaining academy status under the initial 
programme up to 2008/09.    
                                                        
7
 See Eyles, Machin, Silva (2015) for a discussion of the later academies, which are not subject of this paper, in 
part since some of the outcomes we study have not yet had time to occur yet for these more recent conversions.  
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The first academies required the signing up of a sponsor, who would provide part of 
the initial capital cost for the school building, a condition that was later relaxed (National 
Audit Office, 2010). The sponsor can be a business, a charity, a philanthropist, a university 
or a religious organisation. Academies are, like all other publicly funded schools, 
accountable to the central education authority, and are managed by a headteacher who is 
appointed by the governing body. They are subject to the same inspection regime as other 
state funded schools and students have to take exams in the same three compulsory subjects 
at age 16 – English, Maths and Science. While academy schools are free to set their own 
admission policies, they are constrained by the same admissions code as all other state 
funded schools, which implies that they cannot select students based on ability
8
 and that they 
have to give priority to the most disadvantaged students, that is, students who are or have 
been in care and those with learning difficulties.  
English academy schools have some similarities to privately managed schools 
operating in other countries. Table A1 in the Appendix gives examples of the different forms 
of state funded but autonomously managed schools operating in a number of European 
countries and the United States. However, despite sharing similarities with academies, some 
details, particularly with respect to funding and fee charging, vary across countries and 
would make an evaluation of the effect of more autonomy difficult as it may be confounded 
by different levels of financial resources available for certain schools. For instance, Spain’s 
Colegios Concertados, and Germany’s state-funded independent schools can charge fees, 
but they do not receive the same level of government funding that other state-funded schools 
receive. In contrast to England’s academies, France’s private schools under government 
                                                        
8
 Up to 2007/08 schools with specialist subjects (i.e. sports, visual and performing arts) were allowed to select 
up to 10% of their students based on aptitude. A limited form of selection on ability is permitted, so called 
banding. Banding arrangements have to ensure that the intake represents the range of a school’s applicants’ 
abilities (up to 2006) or is representative of the national ability range or the local authority (from 2006). See 
Department for Education and Skills (2003), Department for Education and Skills (2006) and Department for 
Education (2014a).  
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contract (établissements sous contrat) can select pupils based on ability. Unlike England’s 
academy schools, most privately managed but largely publicly funded schools around 
Europe have existed for decades and any evaluation of their introduction is constrained by 
historical data availability. Despite their recent introduction, the share of secondary school 
pupils in England attending academy schools had already reached 44% by 2014, only being 
exceeded by the Netherlands, where over 60% of secondary school pupils in 2012 attended a 
private school. 
Figure 1 shows a ranking of average autonomy levels amongst schools in Western 
Europe and the US using an index derived from the 2012 PISA survey. England ranks 
highest according to this index, which takes higher values as greater resource allocation 
responsibilities fall into the remit of the school. The other nations of the UK did not 
introduce any academy schools, but maintained the community school centred school 
system. As can be seen in the Figure, their autonomy levels are around the OECD average 
and much lower than for the English school system.  
For England and the Rest of the UK, Table 2 uses PISA 2012 data to further probe 
into these autonomy differences. The Table shows the percentage of schools where only the 
principal or teacher, both the principal or teacher and the regional or national education 
authority or school governing bodies, or only the regional or national authority have 
responsibility for the autonomy tasks. The first thing to note is that in all aspects of school 
management England has a higher share of schools for which the principal or teachers only 
are responsible. When we divide the sample into private schools, privately managed and 
publicly funded
9
 – the group academy schools fall into - and public schools – the group 
community schools fall into - we see that within England and the rest of the UK there are 
                                                        
9
 A school is defined as privately managed and publicly funded when it is recorded in PISA as a private school 
and received at least 50% of its funding from the government. This definition is consistent with the one used in 
OECD (2012). 
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significant differences. For instance, among private schools 85% have complete autonomy 
over teacher hiring, while this percentage is 60% for privately managed and publicly funded 
schools and only 46% for state schools.  Overall, privately managed publicly funded schools 
in England are more similar to private schools, in terms of their powers, than to public 
schools. In the rest of the UK, privately managed and publicly funded schools tend to 
delegate most responsibilities to their governing bodies, or responsibilities are held jointly by 
schools and education authorities.  
Existing evidence of the effects of the introduction of more autonomous schools  
England is not the only country to have introduced new types of more autonomous 
schools with the explicit aims of innovating their education system and increasing pupil 
performance. Both the United States, with the introduction of charter schools in 1992, and 
Sweden, which introduced free schools as part of a wider educational reform in the early 
1990s, initiated new school programmes. While these have been pursued on a smaller scale 
than the academies programme - around 6% of state educated pupils in the US attended 
charters in 2013 (National Centre for Education Statistics, 2015) and about 14% attended 
free schools in Sweden in 2012
10
 - they share some similarities. In each case, the schools are 
privately run but rely on public funds to operate; furthermore, these school types enjoy 
greater operational autonomy than other publicly funded schools.  
The extent to which, within Sweden and the US, attendance at these school types has 
aided pupil performance in academic tests and, more importantly, led to positive longer-term 
outcomes, is the subject of a growing literature. The overall nature of the programmes, as 
well as the methods of allocating places in charters and free schools respectively, has shaped 
both the phrasing of research questions and the way in which researchers have estimated 
performance effects for these schools.  
                                                        
10
 Own calculation from PISA 2012 data.  
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 In the Swedish context, the large growth in the publicly funded but independent 
friskola came as a result of educational reforms, particularly the introduction of a voucher 
system, enacted in the early 1990s, which were primarily aimed at increasing competition 
amongst schools at municipality level (see Bjorklund et al., 2005, for a detailed review of the 
various reforms around this period). The voucher system enabled students to attend newly 
established schools funded by their home municipality. Both public and free schools in 
Sweden receive the same level of per pupil funding, so overall funds going to state schools 
fall as the share of students choosing to attend free schools rises. It was hoped that this 
competition for students would drive up educational standards amongst incumbent schools. 
The research on these Swedish independent schools has focused on the competitive 
effects of the voucher system. For example, Bohlmark and Lindahl (2015) relate the share of 
free school pupils at municipality level to municipality level test scores.
11
 As noted by the 
authors, who find positive effects of the voucher reform, any overall performance effect 
found at this aggregated level is a mixture of the direct effect of increased free school 
attendance and the indirect effect that works through changes in state school performance 
that result from increased competition. The emphasis on the competition related effect of the 
reform means that little direct evidence exists of the gains from attending a free school. The 
small, and mainly positive effects that have been found, are elaborated upon in Table 3.  
In contrast to the above, the research on charter schools has focused on the direct 
impact of charter school attendance on both test scores and, in a limited number of cases, 
further outcomes such as college enrolment. The use of admission lotteries to allocate places 
in oversubscribed charters has been used extensively as a natural experiment to isolate the 
casual effects of charter attendance (Abdulkadirolgu et al., 2011) on these outcomes. In a 
similar vein, the random assignment of charter school practices into pre-existing public 
                                                        
11
 Rather than assume that free school entrance is random across municipalities, researchers typically include 
municipality level fixed effects as well as time varying controls.  
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schools has enabled researchers to isolate specific mechanisms by which charter schools 
increase performance in standardized tests (Fryer, 2014). While the majority of papers focus 
on the effect of newly built charters, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) use pre-enrolment in 
schools that later convert to charters, as well as matching, to study the effect of charter 
takeover on test scores and find positive effects; features of this identification strategy are 
detailed extensively in Section 3 in relation to academy school takeovers in England.  
A somewhat stylised finding of the literature on charter schools is that charters are 
able to generate sizeable test score gains in English and Math, and that overall gains often 
mask considerable heterogeneity. Gains often appear to be strongest in urban areas and for 
those who are disadvantaged. A more detailed review of the literature on charter schools and 
free schools can be found in Eyles, Hupkau and Machin (2015). Table 3 of this paper offers 
a brief summary of that longer review. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy  
The focus of the empirical work in this paper is on conversions of existing state schools in 
the English secondary school sector into academies. In England, at the time of our study, 
pupils attended secondary schools from years 7 through 11 of their compulsory education 
when aged 11 to 16. Whilst attending secondary school, students are assessed in Key Stage 3 
in year 9 and Key Stage 4 in year 11, the last year of compulsory education. The Key Stage 4 
exams they take then are known as the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) 
school leaving exams. Prior to attending secondary schools most children (except in the 
minority of local authorities where middle schools are present) make the transition from 
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primary to secondary school having completed their Key Stage 2 assessments in the final 
year of primary school, year 6, at age 11.
12
 
Data 
We use rich administrative data that records schooling outcomes of individual pupils 
through all their Key Stage assessments up to the end of compulsory education at age 16. For 
children who stay on in post-compulsory education we also observe their Key Stage 5 (KS5) 
performance (known as Advanced or A levels) at the age of 18. In addition, we have 
matched higher education administrative data that records all students enrolled in a higher 
education institution in the United Kingdom. We obtain demographic characteristics from 
the School Census, which contains information on age, gender, ethnicity, special educational 
needs status and whether or not the pupil is eligible for free school meals. 
We study two outcomes. The first is Key Stage 4 (KS4) performance, defined as the 
standardised total point score achieved at age 16 for the best 8 results in exams the student 
took at the end of compulsory school.
13
 The second is a post-compulsory schooling outcome, 
degree completion, defined as having completed a Bachelor degree at one of the UK’s higher 
education institutions by age 21, five years after completing compulsory education.  
 
Empirical strategy  
We estimate the effect of academy attendance on KS4 test scores and degree 
completion using repeated cross sections of quasi-natural experiments from events of 
academy conversion that took place in different school years. The events we study are 
described in Table 4. The Table shows a gradual introduction of academy schools, with the 
                                                        
12
 The other assessment in the Key Stage sequence, Key Stage 1, is taken earlier in primary school at age 7 at 
the end of year 2. 
13
 The results reported in this paper are invariant to using alternative Key Stage 4 measures, such as total 
uncapped scores and/or based on alternative scales. See Appendix A of Eyles and Machin (2015) for more 
detailed discussion of the issues to do with measuring KS4 performance of pupils.  
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first three opening in the 2002/3 school year, and then in the subsequent school years as 
follows:  2003/04 - 9; 2004/05 - 5; 2005/06 - 10; 2006/07 - 20; 2007/08 - 36; 2008/09 - 50.  
The conversions we analyse in this paper are for state schools for which we have full 
data before and after they become an academy. Therefore, we are not able to study the 12 
newly set up schools (where there was no predecessor school), nor the 5 private schools on 
which we do not have data. We also do not consider conversions from City Technology 
Colleges (CTCs) as they were already highly autonomous schools that were performing well. 
In fact, many commentators have identified CTCs as the precursors of academies (see West 
and Bailey, 2013).
14
  This leaves us with the following numbers per year, as shown in the 
Table: 2002/3 – 3; 2003/4 – 6; 2004/5 – 2; 2005/6 – 7; 2006/7 – 14; 2007/8 – 25; 2008/9 – 
37. 
To illustrate the empirical approach we adopt, note that in the first year of 
conversions (2002/3), three schools became academies. We only consider children who were 
enrolled in the academy before conversion, which in this case will be children in year 7-10 in 
the school year 2001/2. Because they (and their parents or carers) have already made the 
enrolment decision to attend the school pre-conversion, the conversion is exogenous to them. 
By focussing on individuals who have already made their enrolment decision, this is the 
approach referred to as studying legacy enrolments or ‘grandfathered’ children – defining 
pupils who stay in a converting school as ‘grand-fathered’ pupils - as exploited in, for 
example, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014), who study school takeovers in New Orleans. 
Thus children in year 10 in 2001/2 will sit their Key Stage 4 exams in 2002/3, getting 
one year exposure to the academy; children in year 9 in 2001/2 will sit their exams in 
                                                        
14
 Almost all CTCs took up the opportunity to become academies when it arose with the introduction of 
academy schools. There were only 15 CTCs before the introduction of academy schools and 12 of them 
converted in the school years we consider in this paper. They were highly autonomous schools already, being 
able to not fully follow the national curriculum, to run their own admissions, and not being maintained by the 
local authority. One can argue that the autonomy gains they experienced from academy conversion were 
negligible, unlike for the state maintained schools that converted who we study in this paper. 
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2003/4, gaining two years exposure and so on until the last year group of legacy 
enrolled/grandfathered children (year 7 pupils in the pre-conversion year) will get four years 
exposure taking their Key Stage 4 exams in school year 2005/6. Anyone enrolling from the 
year of conversion 2002/3 onwards are knowingly enrolling in the academy school and 
conversion is not exogenous to them.
15
 
In their event study based analysis of academies, Eyles and Machin (2015) use pupils 
enrolled in schools that become academies after the sample period ends as the control group. 
They show that treatment and control pupils are well balanced on observable pre-treatment 
(i.e. academy conversion) characteristics. For the empirical approach we adopt here, we can 
further refine the definition of control pupils. Consider again the example of the 2002/3 
conversions. The last of the grandfathered children sit their exams in 2005/6, so a valid set of 
control schools would be those that convert in the year following that, 2006/7. We can thus 
match pupils in the same school years as the grandfathered children in treatment schools to 
those in these control schools. Over and above this, the use of students enrolled in future 
academy schools as a control group allows us to control for school level unobservables such 
as ethos for change or being ‘academy friendly’; in addition, as academy schools are 
typically struggling before conversion it allows us to compare outcomes for pupils who 
choose to attend similar, low performing schools.
16
   
The above example refers to one set of conversion events taking place in the 2002/3 
school year. We then have analogous events in subsequent school years, where we can adopt 
the same approach of studying education outcomes for children enrolled in the school before 
it becomes an academy. Thus we can define rolling cohorts of grandfathered children and 
                                                        
15
 Eyles and Machin (2015) and Eyles, Machin and Silva (2015) show, for the academy conversions prior to 
2010 studied in this paper, that the quality of pupil intake (as measured the Key Stage 2 performance of year 7 
enrolments before and after conversion) did indeed increase, thus significantly changing the pupil composition.  
16
 See Eyles and Machin (2015) who show that academy conversions by 2008/9 and the future control group 
conversions they consider were very much concentrated in poorly performing schools. As already noted, there 
is one exception, which is the conversions from City Technology Colleges, who we do not include in our 
analysis. 
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matched children in control schools for conversions that take place across the 2002/3 
through 2008/9 school years. 
For each cross section of academy converters, we use pupils who attend schools that 
convert 4 years after the treatment group as a control group. Overall we study pupils in 303 
treatment and control schools.
17
 To make the control group consistent with the treatment we 
focus on those who are ‘intention to treat’ in the control schools (i.e. they do not get treated 
because the school does not convert, but would have done under the alternative scenario that 
it did convert to become an academy). Thus, intention to treat is defined to match with 
respect to the year of conversion of treatment schools. For instance, our first experimental 
cross-section compares outcomes for year 7-10 students, who in 2002 were enrolled in a 
school that converts in 2003 with year 7-10 students, who in 2002 were enrolled in a school 
that converts in 2007.
18
  
For each of these cohorts of conversion, we identify year 7-10 pupils who are 
enrolled in a school that converts to academy status in the next academic year. Expected 
exposure to academy status, for a pupil in academic year group t, is then defined as 11-t. We 
refer to pupils with non-zero expected years of exposure as the intention to treat group.
19
 As 
an example, pupils in year group 10 in the year prior to conversion have one year of 
potential exposure while pupils in year 7 one-year prior to conversion have 4 years of 
potential exposure. We then use potential years of exposure as an instrument for actual years 
of exposure. 
We also include in our analysis those pupils who sit their exams in the year prior to 
academy conversion, enabling a before/after conversion comparison to be made.  It also 
                                                        
17
 Note therefore that the 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9 treatment schools are also control schools for earlier 
converting cohorts. Owing to the rotation between control and treatment through time, they are therefore 
effectively double counted in Panel A of Table 4. 
18
 If the soon to be converted state schools used as control schools already start to adjust to some degree before 
conversion, then this will lead to a downward bias in the estimates. 
19
 The exposure variable takes values 0-4. Maximum exposure is achieved by those who are enrolled as year 7 
students in a school that converts in the following year and who stay in that school until year 11.  
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enables us to compare baseline pre-conversion pupil performance in matched treatment and 
control schools. It turns out that pupils enrolled are well balanced in terms of pre-conversion 
year Key Stage 4 performance – as shown in Panel B of Table 4.20 
In formal terms, we are interested in the causal impact of exposure to academy status 
on pupil performance. This is modelled in a difference-in-differences specification which 
allows for exposure effects. For pupil i who is pre-enrolled in school s in year t, the basic 
regression setup for studying the impact of academy conversion across the pooled treatment-
control cohorts c takes the form: 
1i st ci st ci st c1i st c1ctsi st c εExposure*e)I(t*AδXβαααY   (1) 
where Y is pupil performance, the α’s are fixed effects (for school s, time t and cohort c 
respectively), X is a row vector of covariates including pupil-level control variables and, in 
some cases, a standardised Key Stage 2 score, and ε1 is an error term. Treatment by academy 
conversion is defined by the post academy conversion indicator e)I(t*A istc   , where A 
denotes a school that becomes an academy in a given year and the indicator function e)I(t   
denotes years after the conversion event year e. As the effect of academy conversion is 
allowed to vary with years of exposure (Exposure), the main parameter of interest - δ1 in (1) 
- is a difference-in-difference estimator with continuous treatment. As well as allowing the 
treatment to vary linearly with years of exposure, we also consider a model with a discrete 
functional form where the treatment effect differs by the number of years the pupil attends 
the academy since conversion. 
The potential problem with only considering ordinary least squares estimates of 
equation (1) is that the population of pupils who sit their exams in the school that converts 
                                                        
20
 The research design adopted here means the balancing tests can only be looked at in the year prior to 
conversion. Of course, the pre-conversion trajectories might be different – this is studied in a different, less 
stringent on data, research design reported on in our companion papers (Eyles and Machin, 2015; Eyles, 
Hupkau and Machin, 2016) with the pre-conversion trends looking similar for treatment and control schools. 
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may not be the same as the pupils who were enrolled pre-conversion. Some pupils of that 
group may leave the school and sit their exams elsewhere. This generates the possibility of a 
threat to our research design because actual treatment status may be non-random: if the 
worst of the legacy enrolled pupils decided to leave schools once they gained academy status 
then our estimates will be upward biased. To circumvent this source of possible bias we 
generate an intention to treat (ITT) estimate and use intention to treat status as an instrument 
for actual treatment in an instrumental variable (IV) setting. The ITT, or reduced form 
equation is: 
2i st ci st ci st c2i st c2ctsi st c εExposure ITT*e)I(t*AδXβαααY   (2) 
where ITT Exposure is the expected years of exposure when viewed from the pre-academy 
conversion year c for the already enrolled pupils. It measures the hypothetical number of 
years in an academy that they would be exposed to were they to stay on to sit their Key 
Stage 4 examinations there. The first stage regression that predicts treatment exposure is 
3i st ci st ci st c3i st c3ctsi st c εExposure ITT*e)I(t*AδXβαααExposure   (3) 
 The IV estimator is then obtained using the prediction of Exposure from (3), which 
can be defined as           in place of the direct Exposure variable in (1) as follows: 
                                                              (4) 
so that the IV estimator    equals the ratio of the reduced form coefficients      . 
The main identifying assumption is that pre-enrolment in a school, which converts in 
year t, as opposed to t+4, is orthogonal to test scores. The fact that schools that convert over 
the 2003-2013 period are observationally similar prior to conversion (see Eyles and Machin 
2015), and that enrolment decisions were made without knowledge that the school would 
subsequently gain academy status, suggests that this assumption is met. Under this 
assumption we estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) of academy exposure that 
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identifies the causal effect of exposure to academy status for those who attend an academy, 
but do so only because they happened to enrol in a school that later gained academy status 
before they left compulsory schooling.  
Further interest lies in how the effect of academy attendance differs across subgroups 
of the population of students. In our empirical work below, we explicitly study 
heterogeneous effects, looking at differences by free school meal status and gender. We also 
consider separate estimates for academy conversions in London compared to those outside 
the capital. A reason for doing this is recent work that emphasises very considerable 
improvements in London schools that have happened over the last fifteen to twenty years. 
This work does not consider causal effects regarding different education policies, often being 
very descriptive in their mode of study (see, for example, Blanden et al., 2015 or Burgess, 
2014). 
 
4. Main results  
First Stages 
Estimates of the first stage regressions (equation (3) above) are reported in Table 5, for two 
functional forms of ITT years of exposure. In columns (1) and (2), which differ on whether 
or not pupil exam results at age 11 (their Key Stage 2 results) are controlled for, the ITT 
years of exposure is a continuous measure, ranging from zero in control schools up to a 
maximum of four for pupils who were pre-enrolled in a to-be-academy in their year 7.  In 
columns (3) and (4), ITT years of exposure is represented by four dummy variables for one, 
two, three and four years respectively. 
 All of the first stage estimates in the Table show a strong relationship between actual 
years of exposure to being educated in an academy and the expected measure defined in the 
pre-conversion year t = (e-1). The estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2) show for the 
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continuous measure that 92.3 percent of the theoretical expected years of exposure were 
completed by the pre-enrolled students. The same pattern, but as one would expect with a 
drop off for longer durations, emerges for the dummy variable representation of ITT 
exposure, as is shown in columns (3) and (4) of the Table. For one year of exposure, 98.5 
percent of ITT predicted years were completed, and this drops to 94.9 percent for two years, 
91.1 percent for three years and 87.5 percent for the maximum four years. 
 These first stages therefore show that a very large fraction of pupils sit their KS4 
exams in the school in which they were pre-enrolled. If a dummy variable for pre-enrolled 
status alone is instead used as the ITT variable to predict actual years of exposure (as in 
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014) it attracts a highly significant estimated coefficient of 1.603 
(with an associated standard error of 0.046).  This suggests, for the sample we study, an 
average of 1.6 years of exposure to being educated in an academy for the pre-enrolled 
pupils.
21
 
Key Stage 4 Results 
 The impact of academy conversion on end of secondary school pupil performance, as 
measured by KS4 points score, is considered in Table 6. The Table shows six sets of 
estimates. Columns (1) to (3) do not include Key Stage 2 performance, while columns (4) to 
(6) show estimates from the value added specifications where Key Stage 2 performance is 
one of the independent variables. For each of these, the three specifications reported are the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (equation (1) above), the intention to treat (ITT) 
estimates (equation (2) above) and the instrumental variable (IV) estimates (equation (4) 
above). For the latter, the first stages are shown in Table 5 (as discussed above). 
                                                        
21
 Because of the cross-cohort rolling conversion dates, the percentages of pupils in each year of post-academy 
conversion treatment are bigger for the smaller years of exposure. More specifically, 53.0 percent have one 
year of exposure, 26.9 percent have two years exposure, 13.8 percent have three years exposure and 6.4 percent 
have the maximum four years. 
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 The results show that KS4 performance improved significantly for pupils in the 
academy conversions relative to pupils in the control schools. The OLS estimate in column 
(1) points to a significant 0.099σ improvement per year of exposure in KS4 scores for 
children enrolled in a pre-conversion school as compared to children enrolled in control 
schools in the same school years. The ITT exposure estimate is a little smaller at 0.075σ as 
shown in column (2), and the IV estimate in column (3) lies between the two at 0.081σ.  The 
value added specifications produce results that temper the magnitudes a little, as shown in 
columns (4) to (6), but there remains a significant improvement in KS4 performance. The IV 
estimate in the last column shows an improvement of 0.072σ for one year of exposure. This 
translates into a sizable 0.288σ for legacy-enrolled pupils who receive four years of 
secondary schooling in an academy. 
 This significant raising of KS4 outcomes for pupils already enrolled in the highly 
disadvantaged schools that subsequently became academies suggests that the academy 
conversion raised their performance relative to the counterfactual of no conversion. The IV 
estimates have the interpretation of local average treatment effects (LATE).
22
 The estimated 
effects are local to those who were induced to attend an academy only because they were 
enrolled prior to conversion, meaning that these individuals would not have attended an 
academy had they not been pre-enrolled. Given the high compliance rates in the first stages 
shown in Table 5, the LATE appears to be relevant for many pupils. 
Degree Completion 
 Using the same structure as Table 6, Table 7 shows estimates of the causal impact of 
academy conversion for an educational outcome measured five years after KS4 - namely, 
                                                        
22
 See Angrist and Imbens (1994). The conditions are intuitively reasonable in the context we study. They 
require that those individuals who do not receive treatment, despite being pre-enrolled in an academy, would 
still not have received treatment if they had not been pre-enrolled. We also require that being pre-enrolled is 
random across individuals, and unrelated to, for instance, ability. The balancing tests shown above in Table 4 
indicate that on average individuals pre-enrolled in a school that would subsequently become an academy did 
not differ in their KS4 performance compared to pupils enrolled in the control schools.  
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whether individuals in our sample complete a Bachelor degree at university.  Only 7 percent 
in the sample of both treatment and control schools do, which is a long way below the 
national average (of around 20 percent for the measure we look at in the years we study
23
), 
again showing that the pupils we are studying are highly disadvantaged.  
 The results show that being exposed to academy conversion significantly raises the 
probability of degree completion. The IV estimates in the final column show a 0.7 
percentage point improvement for a one-year increase in exposure (which multiplies up to 
2.8 percentage points for four years exposure) that is statistically significant. Thus it seems 
there are longer lasting effects for those children who benefitted from attending an academy, 
with the probability of getting a university degree rising by about 10 percent, relative to the 
mean of the dependent variable, with a one-year increase in years of exposure. 
Functional Form for Exposure 
 Next we consider estimates where, rather than imposing the linear functional form 
for exposure to education in an academy school, we consider a dummy variable 
representation. The results are shown for both outcome variables in Table 8. Whilst the 
estimated coefficients do rise monotonically across the four dummy variables for all 
specifications, closer inspection of the separate estimates shows the linear continuous 
measure does not fully represent the pattern of the estimates. In particular, the effects for one 
year of exposure are quite small relative to two and above years. Indeed, it is two or more 
years of exposure that translates into sizable effects for both outcomes.  
                                                        
23
 Over the period of analysis, on average about 21% of students in England entered university at age 18. 
Combined with an average non-completion probability of just under 10%, we estimate that about 20% of 
students complete a first degree with three years duration (Bachelor degree) within 5 years of leaving 
compulsory education, that is, by the age of 21. This measure of degree completion is somewhat strict, as it 
requires a straight path from lower secondary school to upper secondary school and immediate enrolment into a 
degree at age 18. Disadvantaged students often do not follow such a straight path into university and tend to 
take longer to complete university entry requirements. Furthermore, some students in the UK take a gap year 
between school and university. We are forced to adopt this strict definition of degree completion because the 
last cohort of KS4 exam takers (in school year 2008/9) used in our analysis is only observed in higher 
education data up to the year 2013/14, which is 5 years after age 16 exams. As more recent data becomes 
available in due course a relaxation of the degree completion definition to within 6 years can be adopted.  
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5. Heterogeneous effects and additional tests 
Variations by Free School Meals and Gender 
In Table 9 we show estimates where years of exposure to an academy education in 
secondary school are allowed to vary with two pupil characteristics - free school meal 
eligibility status (FSM) and gender. The Table shows estimates from IV value added 
specifications for the continuous treatment intensity variable. Results proved qualitatively 
the same if the dummy variable representation was used, but were much more cluttered for 
presentational purposes, and the basic story emerges more clearly for the continuous 
measure.
24
 
 The column (1) specification shows that the impact of academy conversion on KS4 
results is larger in magnitude for disadvantaged pupils. For those eligible for free school 
meals (FSM), there is a 0.089σ effect for an additional year of exposure as compared to a 
0.063σ effect for non-FSM eligible pupils. There is a less marked gender related difference 
in effects, as shown in column (2), where magnitudes are nearly the same at 0.072σ for male 
pupils and 0.071σ for female pupils. Consideration of both pupil characteristics together, in 
the four-way breakdown shown in column (3), reveals that it is FSM rather than gender that 
is more important in terms of heterogeneous effects. 
 Evidence of heterogeneity in the estimated effects is less clear for the degree 
completion outcome measure. As the estimates reported in columns (4) to (6) show, the 
estimates of the impact of years of exposure to being educated in an academy secondary 
school are similar when broken down by FSM or gender or by both. This is probably 
suggestive of some fade out of the initially bigger effects for FSM pupils at KS4. Pupils 
                                                        
24
 The full dummy variable results are available on request from the authors. 
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treated by academy conversion are more likely to graduate with a degree, but with little 
variation by pupil disadvantage. 
London and Non-London Academies 
 In Table 10 we consider estimates that further break down the four-way 
heterogeneity grouping for London and Non-London schools. Overall, there were 41 schools 
in London and 262 outside London. There is an interesting pattern of considerably larger 
effects for pupils attending London academies. Effects of academy attendance on KS4 
results and degree completion for pupils in London schools are often as much as twice as big 
as for pupils in schools outside of the capital. For instance, increasing academy exposure by 
one year increases KS4 exam results by about 0.10σ for disadvantaged boys and by about 
0.09σ for disadvantaged girls in London, compared to 0.062σ and 0.063σ for disadvantaged 
boys and girls, respectively, attending an academy outside London. A one-year increase in 
exposure to an academy based in London increases the likelihood of degree completion by 1 
percentage point for both boys and girls in the FSM eligible group.  This is highly suggestive 
that the academy conversions of the 2002-2008 time period played a role in the performance 
improvements documented for London over this same period elsewhere (Burgess, 2014; 
Blanden et al., 2015; Wyness, 2011). Our results are consistent with estimates for US charter 
schools that find that effects of charter school attendance were stronger in urban areas and 
for disadvantaged students (Angrist et al., 2013).  
 
Use of Academy Freedoms 
 It is interesting to consider which of the additional freedoms academy status brings 
lie behind the positive effects on student outcomes.  Table 11 shows the use of academy 
freedoms from survey responses to a Department for Education (2014b) survey of head 
teachers. In total, there are responses from 148 sponsored academies, comprising 23 of the 
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academies we study in this paper, alongside responses from 125 academies that opened after 
our sample period ends.
25
 
  The first column of the Table reports the percentage of responding academies that 
have made changes. The very fact that a large number of changes have been implemented 
emphasises that academy conversion appears to be an overall school improvement 
programme, and one that affords a large number of new ways to run a school with increased 
autonomy for those who convert. The three most prominent changes, amongst the 23 
converters in our sample, were ‘changed school leadership’, ‘procured services that were 
previously provided by the local authority’ and ‘changed the curriculum you offer’. Over 75 
percent of the schools said they made these changes pursuant to gaining the new academy 
freedoms. This ranking is broadly consistent with that of the 148 sponsored academies 
overall.  
 When asked what the most important change was, two answers dominate - ‘changed 
school leadership’ (56 percent) and ‘changed the curriculum you offer’ (26 percent).  
Furthermore, both of these were reported to be linked to improved outcomes (in 73 and 77 
percent of cases respectively). Other changes that were notably linked to improved outcomes 
were ‘Increased the length of the school day’ (63 percent) and ‘Collaborated with other 
schools in more formalised partnerships’ (45 percent). 
 When one considers the most important change schools claim to have made, it is 
evident that more operational, day-to-day running type changes are less important. The key 
responses here are those concerning school leadership changes, changes in the curriculum 
and creating formalised partnerships with other schools. These are all factors that enhanced 
                                                        
25
 For comparability with our sample we only consider responses to the survey for sponsored academies, as all 
of the academies we study in this paper are sponsored academies. Prior to the 2010 Academies Act having a 
sponsor was a requirement for setting up an academy (see also Section 2).  
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the ability to operate in an autonomous manner, and are likely to lie behind the pupil 
performance improvements from academy conversion identified in our empirical analysis.  
 The importance of headteacher changes at the time of conversion is studied in the 
empirical analysis reported on in Eyles and Machin (2015) who show headteacher turnover 
in the year of conversion to be very prevalent. In fact turnover of the headteacher is over 60 
percentage points higher in treatment as compared to control schools. In line with the 
suggestion in Table 11 that academies made use of their ability to hire teachers without 
qualified teacher status to supplement their existing teaching stock, there is also some 
evidence of modest positive changes in the number of teaching staff around conversion. 
Thus the idea that leadership matters is reaffirmed as part of the mechanisms behind school 
improvements from the initial academies programme. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The focus of this paper is whether school reforms, specifically those involving the 
introduction of new, more autonomous, school types improve pupil outcomes. The main 
school reforms of this nature that have taken place in the past twenty years or so have been 
the introduction of free schools in Sweden, charter schools in America and academy schools 
in England. We discuss how each has impacted on performance, but the main empirical 
application of the paper is on the causal impact of academy school attendance on pupil 
outcomes in England. 
 We study the academy introductions that took place in English secondary schools 
between the 2002/3 and 2008/9 school years. For the most part, these were conversions of 
already existing disadvantaged schools to academies, which were able to operate with much 
more autonomy than in their predecessor state after conversion. By studying pupils already 
enrolled in schools prior to conversion, and comparing them to earlier cohorts enrolled in the 
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school and to a matched set of similar control schools, we study the impact on end of 
compulsory school performance and on degree completion within five years after the 
compulsory school leaving age. We find significant improvements in both outcomes, 
suggesting that the academies programme, which was targeted at badly performing schools, 
significantly improved pupil performance. Our estimates are quite sizable, at around 29 
percent of a standard deviation improvement for legacy-enrolled pupils who receive four 
years exposure, but not as big as the largest estimates in the charter school studies.  
Moreover, like the charter findings of more beneficial effects for disadvantaged children in 
urban areas, we uncover parallel evidence of bigger effects for disadvantaged pupils and for 
those in London schools. Finally, we offer evidence that the increased autonomy available to 
academies, particularly with respect to improved management and curriculum flexibility, 
were important factors enabling the performance improvements for pupils attending 
academy schools in the time period we study.  
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Figure 1: PISA Autonomy Levels over Resource Allocation in Europe and the US 
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Notes: Index (standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation one across all 34 OECD 
countries in PISA 2012) based upon six dimensions of school autonomy: teacher hiring; teacher 
firing; establishing teachers’ starting salaries; determining teachers’ salary increases; 
formulating the school budget; deciding on budget allocations in schools. The index is 
calculated from information on all six autonomy tasks on the percentage of students in schools 
who say that only ‘principals and teachers’ or both ‘principals and teachers’ and the 
‘regional/national education authority’ has/have considerable responsibility as compared to 
only the ‘regional/national education authority’. These numbers are the average index reported 
in Figure IV.4.2 of OECD (2013) but where additionally the United Kingdom is broken out into 
England and the Rest of the UK. 
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Table 1 - Number (Percent) of State Secondary Schools in England, 2001/02 and 2008/09 
 
  
Number (Percent) of State Secondary Schools by Type 
 
 2001/2 2008/9 
 (1) (2) 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
     
Academy 0 0.0 133 4.0 
City technology college 15 0.4 3 0.1 
Voluntary aided 549 15.8 537 16.0 
Foundation 501 14.4 560 16.7 
Voluntary controlled 129 3.7 111 3.3 
Community 2278 65.6 2017 59.9 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Source – School Census. Includes middle schools. Excludes special schools. From Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and Table 2a in  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120504203418/http://education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/VOL/v000359/dfes_schools_fina
l.pdf  
Brief descriptions of the secondary school types are:   
Academy schools (prior to 2010/11):  all ability independent from local authority specialist schools, which do not charge fees, and are 
not maintained by the local authority; established by sponsors from business, faith, HE institutions or voluntary groups, working in 
partnership with central government.   
City Technology Colleges:  all ability independent from local authority schools, which do not charge fees, and are not maintained by the 
local education authority. Their curriculum has a particular focus on science and technology education (see West and Bailey, 2013). They 
were established by sponsors from business, faith or voluntary groups.  
Voluntary-aided schools are maintained by the local authority. The foundation (generally religious) appoints most of the governing body.  
The governing body is responsible for admissions and employing the school staff 
Foundation (formerly grant-maintained) schools are maintained by the local authority.  The governing body is responsible for 
admissions and employing the school staff. 
Voluntary-controlled schools are maintained by the local authority. These are mostly religious schools where the local authority 
continues to be the admission authority.  
Community schools are maintained by the local authority. The local authority is responsible for admissions and employing the school 
staff. 
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Table 2: Autonomy Comparisons By School Type, PISA 2012, England and Rest of UK 
 
  Teacher hiring  Teacher firing  
Teacher starting 
salaries  
Teacher salary 
increases 
Budget formulation  Budget allocation  
  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
                   
England – all schools 55 45 0 26 73 1 36 53 11 22 72 6 13 84 3 47 53 0 
Private schools 85 15 0 54 46 0 53 47 0 27 73 0 16 84 0 67 33 0 
Priv. managed/publ. funded  60 40 0 35 63 1 41 47 12 28 69 3 19 80 1 52 48 0 
State schools 46 54 0 12 87 1 29 59 12 15 75 10 7 87 6 39 61 0 
Rest of UK – all schools 35 64 1 7 59 34 2 34 64 3 41 56 8 53 39 56 43 1 
Private schools 82 18 0 28 72 0 17 83 0 10 73 17 3 97 0 68 32 0 
Priv. managed/publ. funded  0 100 0 0 100 0 0 57 43 0 100 0 0 73 27 0 100 0 
State schools 34 65 1 6 58 36 2 32 67 3 39 59 9 51 40 56 42 1 
                   
 
  
Notes: Percentage of students in schools where – 1. Only ‘principals and teachers’; 2. Both ‘principals and teachers’ and the ‘regional/national education authority’ or school governing 
bodies 3. Only ‘regional/national education authority’ has/have considerable responsibility over the six autonomy tasks.  
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Table 3: Summary of Related Studies on New School Types 
 
 
Evidence on Sweden’s Free Schools 
 
Of the 4 papers
a
 discussed in Eyles, Machin and Hupkau (2015) 3 find positive and significant effects of free school attendance on percentile ranks in 9th grade test scores 
([1], [2], [3]).  The largest effect is a 6.69 percentile rank improvement in English [2] while the smallest is a 0.318 percentile rank improvement in Swedish [1]. The other 
paper [4] finds that some of the municipality level increases in performance can be attributed directly to greater number of students attending free schools. 
 
 
Evidence on US Charter Schools 
 
Of the 12 papers
b
 discussed in Eyles, Machin and Hupkau (2015) all but 2 of the papers ([1], [4]) which focus on, typically state level, test scores find no positive effect on 
average, although one of these [4] does find a positive effect within the subsample of free school meal eligible pupils. A single paper [8] finds small negative effects of 
charter attendance in non-urban areas while finding positive effects in urban settings. The remaining papers find positive effects that, in all but one case [11], are higher in 
math than in English. The estimates for math performance lie between 0.1 and 0.35 while those in English lie between 0.05 and 0.2. The sole paper [11] that finds 
improvements in English test scores over and above math ones finds a 0.3 increase for math and a 0.4 increase for English. Two of the papers ([9], [10]) explore the effects of 
charter attendance on further outcomes such as college enrolment and incarceration finding that charter school attendance increases the probability of the former while 
decreasing the latter. The values are non-trivial: charter attendance decreases a male attendees probability of incarceration by 7 percentage points while increasing the 
probability of college enrolment, for males and females, by between 0.17 and 0.28 percentage points 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: a – the 4 papers are: [1] – Ahlin (2003); [2] Bjorklund et al. (2005); [3] Bohlmark and Lindahl (2007); [4] Bohlmark and Lindahl (2015); b – the 12 papers are: [1] 
– Betts et al. (2006); [2] Hoxby et al. (2009); [3] Angrist et al. (2010); [4] Gleason et al. (2010); [5] Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011); [6]  Dobbie and Fryer (2011); [7] 
Dobbie and Fryer (2013); [8] Angrist et al. (2013); [9] Angrist et al. (2016); [10] Dobbie and Fryer (2014); [11] Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014);  [12] Fryer (2014).  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
34 
 
Table 4:  Number of Academy Conversions by Year and Balancing Tests 
 
         
 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 All 
         
         
A. Treatment and Control Schools         
 
Number of Conversions 
 
3 
 
9 
 
5 
 
10 
 
20 
 
36 
 
50 
 
133 
Number of Conversions With Full Data 3 6 2 7 14 25 37 94 
Number of Control Schools Who Convert Four Years Later  14 25 37 58 56 41 54 285 
         
         
 2002/3 to 2005/6 2006/7 to 2008/9 All 
         
         
B. Balancing Tests    
    
Key Stage 4 For Pupils Enrolled One Year Before Conversion -0.016  
(0.046) 
0.017  
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
Degree Completion For Pupils Enrolled One Year Before Conversion -0.004  
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
    
Number of Pupils 27384 42948 70332 
Number of Schools 152 227 303 
         
 
 
 
  
Notes:  Source for upper panel is <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/175360/academies_annual_report_2010-11.pdf>. Balancing tests in lower panel are treatment-control 
differences reported for pooled 2002/3 to 2005/6 and 2006/7 to 2008/9 cohorts (pooled for number of school sample size reasons) and across all cohorts. The tests are carried out on matched treatment-control pupil-
level data in the year before academy conversion and include the following controls:  dummies for whether the pupil is male, the pupil’s ethnicity group, whether they are eligible for free school meals 
and whether they have special educational needs, plus KS2 test scores and a dummy variable for pupils for whom KS2 data is unavailable. Standard errors clustered at school level reported in 
parentheses.   
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Table 5: First Stages 
 
 
 
Exposure 
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ITT Exposure 
 
0.923 
(0.006) 
 
0.923 
(0.006) 
  
One Year of ITT Exposure 
 
  
0.985   
(0.001) 
0.985   
(0.001) 
Two Years of ITT Exposure   
0.949   
(0.003) 
0.949   
(0.003) 
 
Three Years of ITT Exposure 
  
0.911   
(0.006) 
0.911   
(0.006) 
 
Four Years of ITT Exposure 
  
0.875   
(0.013) 
0.875   
(0.013) 
     
Key Stage 2 No Yes No Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 255638 255638 255638 255638 
Number of Schools 303 303 303 303 
     
     
  Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control 
variables are dummies for whether the pupil is male, the pupil’s ethnicity group, whether 
they are eligible for free school meals and whether they have special educational needs.  
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Table 6: Key Stage 4  
 
  
Standardised Key Stage 4 Points Score 
 
 OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Exposure 0.099 
(0.015)  
0.081 
(0.017) 
0.088 
(0.015)  
0.072 
(0.016) 
ITT Exposure 
 
0.075 
(0.016)   
0.066 
(0.015)  
Key Stage 2  
   
0.506 
(0.005) 
0.506 
(0.005) 
0.506 
(0.005) 
       
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 
Number of Schools 303 303 303 303 303 303 
       
 
  Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables are 
dummies for whether the pupil is male, the pupil’s ethnicity group, whether they are eligible for free 
school meals and whether they have special educational needs. In specifications including KS2 test 
scores a dummy variable for pupils for whom KS2 data is unavailable is additionally included. 
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Table 7: Degree Completion  
 
  
Degree Completion 
 
 OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Exposure 0.009 
(0.002)  
0.008 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.002)  
0.007 
(0.002) 
ITT Exposure 
 
0.007 
(0.002)   
0.006 
(0.002)  
Key Stage 2  
   
0.052 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
       
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
       
Sample Size 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 
Number of Schools 303 303 303 303 303 303 
       
 
  Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables are 
dummies for whether the pupil is male, the pupil’s ethnicity group, whether they are eligible for free 
school meals and whether they have special educational needs. In specifications including KS2 test 
scores a dummy variable for pupils for whom KS2 data is unavailable is additionally included. 
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Table 8: Functional Form For Years of Exposure 
 
  
Standardised Key Stage 4  
Points Score 
 
 
Degree Completion  
 
 OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
One Year of Exposure 0.043 
(0.023)  
0.038 
(0.024) 
0.007 
(0.003)  
0.008 
(0.004) 
Two Years of Exposure 0.204 
(0.035)  
0.177 
(0.037) 
0.014 
(0.005)  
0.014 
(0.005) 
Three Years of Exposure 0.284 
(0.059)  
0.226 
(0.061) 
0.025 
(0.006)  
0.022 
(0.006) 
Four Years of Exposure 0.288 
(0.063)  
0.235 
(0.071) 
0.027 
(0.009)  
0.024 
(0.010) 
One Year of ITT Exposure 
 
0.038 
(0.024)   
0.008 
(0.004)  
Two Years of ITT Exposure 
 
0.168 
(0.036)   
0.013 
(0.005)  
Three Years of ITT Exposure 
 
0.209 
(0.056)   
0.021 
(0.006)  
Four Years of ITT Exposure 
 
0.214 
(0.062)   
0.022 
(0.008)  
Key Stage 2  0.506 
(0.005) 
0.506 
(0.005) 
0.506 
(0.005) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.001) 
       
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 
Number of Schools 303 303 303 303 303 303 
       
 
  
Notes: As for Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 9: Heterogeneity - Free School Meals and Gender 
 
  
Standardised Key Stage 4  
Points Score 
 
 
Degree Completion 
 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Exposure X Free School Meals 0.089 
(0.018)   
0.006 
(0.002)   
Exposure X Not Free School Meals 0.063 
(0.016)   
0.007 
(0.002)   
Exposure X Male 
 
0.072 
(0.017)   
0.006 
(0.002)  
Exposure X Female 
 
0.071 
(0.016)   
0.007 
(0.002)  
Exposure X Free School Meals, Male 
  
0.091 
(0.018)   
0.007 
(0.002) 
Exposure X Free School Meals, Female 
  
0.087 
(0.020)   
0.006 
(0.003) 
Exposure X Not Free School Meals, Male 
  
0.064 
(0.017)   
0.006 
(0.002) 
Exposure X Not Free School Meals, Female   0.063 
(0.016) 
  0.009 
(0.003) 
       
Key Stage 2  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 255638 
Number of Schools 303 303 303 303 303 303 
       
 
  
Notes: As for Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 10: Additional Heterogeneity - London and Non-London Schools 
 
  
Standardised Key Stage 4 
Points Score 
 
 
Degree Completion 
 
 London Non-London London Non-London 
 IV IV IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Exposure X Free School Meals, Male 0.103 
(0.024) 
0.062 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Exposure X Free School Meals, Female 0.088 
(0.025) 
0.063 
(0.026) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Exposure X Not Free School Meals, Male 0.089 
(0.026) 
0.059 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.002) 
Exposure X Not Free School Meals, Female 0.083 
(0.024) 
0.059 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
     
Key Stage 2  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 34998 220640 34998 220640 
Number of Schools 41 262 41 262 
     
 
  Notes: As for Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 11: Department of Education Survey Responses on Academy Freedoms 
 
 23 Labour Academies 
148 Sponsored Academies  
Including the 23 Labour Academies 
 
Percent Making Change 
 
Percent Say Most 
Important Change 
 
 
Percent Making Change Say 
Linked to Improved Attainment 
 
     
Changed school leadership 87 72 56 73 
Procured services that were previously provided by the LA 78 83 5 17 
Changed the curriculum you offer 74 61 26 77 
Changed the performance management system for teachers 74 70 3 39 
Collaborated with other schools in more formalised 
partnerships 
70 68 8 45 
Introduced savings in back-office functions 70 55 0 12 
Added non-teaching positions 70 50 3 31 
Reconstituted your governing body 65 76 0 26 
Changed your pattern of capital expenditure 65 54 1 19 
Increased the number of pupils on roll 61 41 0 12 
Hired teachers without qualified teacher status (QTS) 48 24 0 14 
Introduced or increased revenue-generating activities 48 34 0 8 
Changed your admission criteria 43 20 0 7 
Increased the length of the school day 39 18 0 63 
Changed staff pay structures 30 24 0 9 
Sought to attract pupils from a different geographical area 13 12 0 11 
Changed the length of school terms 9 6 0 22 
Reduced the number of pupils on roll 4 3 0 0 
     
 
 
 
 
 
:  
  
Notes: Taken from Department for Education (2014b). 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Examples of Privately Managed, Government Dependent Schools in Europe and the United States 
Country/school type 
Can set 
admission policy 
Funding through 
Fee 
Charging 
Subject to 
inspection 
Teacher 
hiring 
Exist 
since 
Funding parity 
Share of students in 
secondary school (latest 
figures) 
England: academy 
school 
Yes, but subject 
to rules
a, c
 
Central 
government 
  
early 
2000's 
equal state funding as public 
schools 
48% (2014) 
France: établissement 
sous contrat 
Yes, but subject 
to rules
b
 
Central 
government 
  
around 
1960 
equal state funding as public 
schools 
22% (2012) 
Germany: Schule in 
freier Trägerschaft 
Yes 
Local 
government 
(State and school 
district) 
  
around 
1920 
less state funding as public 
schools (teacher salaries and part 
of capital cost are born by school) 
11% (2014) 
Italy: Scuole paritaria Yes 
Central 
government 
 f 
early 
2000's 
equal treatment as public schools 
with respect to funding  
3% (2012)  
Netherlands: Private 
schools 
No
d
 
Central 
government 
   1917 
equal state funding as public 
schools 
66% (2012)  
Spain: Colegios 
Concertados 
Yes 
Local 
government 
(autonomous 
region) 
  
around 
1985 
less state funding than public 
schools 
26% (2014) – figure 
includes primary 
schools 
Sweden: friskolor 
No (first-come, 
first-served) 
Local 
government 
   1992 
equal state funding as public 
schools 
14% (2012)  
United States: charter 
schools 
No (first-come, 
first-served)
 e
 
Local 
government 
(State and school 
district) 
  
early 
1990's 
often receive less state funding 
than public schools 
6.3% (2013)  
 Notes: a - Academy schools follow the same admissions code as all other state funded schools. Contrary to community schools however, whose admission arrangements are set by the local authority, 
academies are their own admissions authority. b - Students cannot be refused admission based on their religious beliefs or race. c - Admission policies cannot be selective. d - No school can refuse an 
applicant unless full. When oversubscribed a catchment area criterion is used as a tie break. e - If a charter school is oversubscribed, a random lottery should be used to assign places. f - Inspections exists 
theoretically but are rarely carried out. 
